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COMMENTARY
COLLEGE ADMISSION POLICIES BASED ON SEX
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN*
I. IN RODUCTION
T here are many institutions of higher education in the United
States that exclude students from admission on the basis of
sex. Some schools practice their sexual admission policies overtly
while others are more secretive; it is well known, however, that
there are many schools restricted to either men or women alone.
In addition, some schools attempt to limit the admission of mem-
bers of an "undesirable" sex either by using a quota system or by
setting higher admission standards for the undesirables. As is too
often the case with a suspicious situation, a lack of data conceals
the extent to which sexual admission policies in higher education
exist. Nevertheless, a Presidential Task Force recently reported
that there is enough known information to make it apparent that
sexually discriminatory admission policies in college and univer-
sities are widespread. The Task Force recommended that the
United States Commissioner of Education should henceforth con-
duct a survey to document sexual discrimination in education,
as he does for discrimination based on race, religion, and national
origin.' Although both men and women have been excluded
from schools because of sex, women have been the primary tar-
gets of sexual admissions policies. Due to such policies, many
women are denied the opportunity to attend the schools of their
choice, and some are denied the opportunity to attend any school
whatsoever.2 This situation raises a serious constitutional ques-
0 B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1964; J.D., University of Southern California,
1967; currently a Keigwin Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is on
leave from the Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare; however, the opinions stated herein are those of the author in his private
capacity and should in no way be considered those of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare.
1. THIz REPORT OF TzE PRsmsDENT's TASK FoRCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RFSPON-
sinLrrEs, A MAIER OF SIMPLE JusnicE 7-8, 22-24 (1970).
2. Admittedly, there may be various reasons why women do not attend college.
However, statistics do show that although for many years the number of females that
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tion: Is it a violation of the equal protection clause for colleges
and universities to exclude students on the basis of sex?
Public institutions of higher education are of course engaged
in state action that is subject to the fourteenth amendment. But
sexual admission policies also exist at many schools that tradition-
ally have been considered "private" and thus beyond the ambit
of the fourteenth amendment. However, it is well established that
activities that either serve public functions or that are financed
with public funds, even when performed by private entities, may
constitute state action that must be given constitutional protec-
tion.3 According to these criteria, many schools are no longer as
private as they would like to think. In fact, there has been a trend
toward recognizing the many public aspects of private schools. 4
Today, at both public and private schools, higher education is an
important public function; the nation depends upon it for edu-
cated manpower, and individuals depend upon it for economic
and social success.5 Additionally, in the last decade private col-
leges and universities have been increasingly financed with gov-
ernment funds." Thus, as Professor O'Neil concludes, "a growing
graduate from high school has been higher than the number of males, the number
of females admitted to college each year is always lower than the number of males.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 187. In 1968 there were
4,477,649 male students enrolled in institutions of higher education, and only 3,035,442
female students. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 1969 DIm OF EDU-
CATIONAL STATISTICS 60. It is not known how many females attend a college not of their
choice due to sexual admission policies.
3. E.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Griffin v. County School Board, 377
U.S. 218 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946); Hammond v. University of Tampa, 334 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965);
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 938 (1964); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
4. For an extensive and excellent analysis of the public aspects of private colleges
and universities, see O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV.
155 (1969-70).
5. See text at notes 36-44 infra.
6. In 1966 (the last year for which complete figures are available) 26.5% of the
income of private institutions of higher education came from governmental sources.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 1969 DIGEsT OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS
86. Between 1956 and 1966, while governmental aid to higher education has increased
absolutely and proportionately, non-governmental payments have decreased. It is esti-
mated that in this decade private colleges and universities will receive from one-third
to one-half of their income from government sources. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, EDUCATION IN THE SEVENTIES 27-28 (1968), and 1969 DIGEST OF EDUCA-
TIONAL STATISICS 97.
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number of . . . private institutions are so clearly public in sub-
stance if not in form that courts should have no hesitation treating
them precisely the same as state colleges and universities."7 There-
fore, the inquiry qf whether sexual admission policies violate the
equal protection clause applies not only to public schools, but
also to many, if not all, private schools.
II. THE INEQUALITY OF ADMISSION POLICIES
BASED ON SEX
Since its landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education,8
the Supreme Court has made it quite clear that for a school to
deny persons admission on the basis of race is inherent discrimi-
nation for which there is no justification. That decision, although
not complied with by many schools, at least is settled as a "legal"
matter. With the recognition that sexual segregation bears many
similarities to racial segregation,9 there have been several at-
tempts to have the courts also outlaw the sexual admission poli-
cies of colleges and universities. In Heaton v. Bristol10 and Allred
v. Heaton," two Texas cases that pre-dated the women's rights
movement, the state Court of Civil Appeals twice rejected pleas
for orders directing an all-male state college to sexually integrate
its student body. In 1970, two cases challenging sexual segregation
in colleges were decided by federal district courts. In Kirstein v.
University of Virginia2 the state was ordered to stop excluding
female students from admission to the University of Virginia at
Charlottesville, and in Williams v. McNair13 South Carolina was
allowed to continue to operate Winthrop College as a school for
women only. In each of these cases the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of admission policies based on sex as violative of
the equal protection clause.
As the Williams case indicates, considerable opposition exists
to the proposition that the equal protection clause requires equal-
7. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 188.
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See sources and discussion in Murray So Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law:
Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH- L. REV. 232, 233-42 (1965).
10. 317 S.W.2d 86 (rex. Civ. App. 1958).
11. 336 S.W.2d 251 (rex. Civ. App. 1960).
12. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
13. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
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ity of treatment for members of both sexes. The defenders of the
status quo will not easily concede that sexual classifications in edu-
cation are as inherently discriminatory and as unjustifiable as ra-
cial classifications. The old arguments that the courts rejected for
racial integration are now being proferred in an attempt to main-
tain sexual segregation. The decision in Williams that a state
school open only to members of one sex does not violate the equal
protection clause was based in part on the following rationale:
It must be remembered too, that Winthrop is merely a part of an
entire system of State-supported higher education. It may not be
considered in isolation. If the state operated only one college and
that college was Winthrop, there can be no question that to deny
males admission thereto would be impermissible under the Equal
Protection Clause. But, as we have already remarked, these plain-
tiffs have a complete range of state institutions they may attend.14
This statement is nothing more than a slightly disguised
version of the old "separate but equal" doctrine that was sup-
posedly laid to rest in the Brown case, but has apparently been re-
incarnated in South Carolina as far as sexual discrimination is
concerned. Those cases1e 5 which have relied on the separate but
equal doctrine have failed to explain how the explicit statement
in Brown that separate educational facilities are "inherently un-
equal" can be any less true of segregation based on sex than it is
of segregation based on race. Although sex has not yet been de-
clared a "suspect classification" like race, separate educational fa-
cilities remain unequal regardless of who uses them. As will be
discussed below, sexual segregation in schools involves many of
the aspects that were the foundation of the Supreme Court's ruling
in Brown.
As indicated in Brown, segregation, especially when sanc-
tioned by law, is inherently discriminatory because it has a detri-
mental effect upon the excluded class by signifying that its mem-
bers are subordinate and unwanted. 6 Women are the primary
14. Id. at 137.
15. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970); Allred v. Heaton, 336
S.W.2d at 258-61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d at 98-100 (Tcx.
Civ. App. 1958).
16. 347 U.S. at 494.
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targets of sexual segregation in higher education.17 Relegating
them to separate educational facilities stamps them with a badge
of inferiority-a manifestation of the male-oriented society in
which women are kept in their "place.'- 8  In fact, sexual sepa-
ratism in education originated because men were generally con-
sidered to be intellectually superior to women, whose position
in life could rarely be anything better than housewife.' 9 Women,
of course, sense that they are considered to be intellectually in-
ferior,20 and this affects their ability to learn. In many cases, a
sense of inferiority unfortunately becomes a "self-fulfilling proph-
ecy"2' 1 that imprints society's misguided notions about women
upon the minds of individual females.' Sexual admission poli-
cies, like racial ones, are harmful because they generate feelings
of inferiority about and among the excluded group, causing frus-
tration and degradation for its members.
Moreover, as was held in the Brown case, it is impossible for
separate educational institutions to be equal in nature.s Schools
possess "'qualities which are incapable of measurement but which
make for greatness." 24 Even if schools are seemingly equal in as-
pects such as physical facilities and the scope of their curricula
(which is doubtful), there are intangible factors such as the quality
17. While it is true that in Williams the complainants were males, they suffer the
harm, discussed below, of being denied equal educational opportunity. Furthermore, as
a matter of policy, the separate but equal doctrine is not a valid basis for allowing
unequal treatment regardless of whom the complainants are.
18. See C. BIRD, BORN FEMALE Ch. 6 (1968); C. JENCKS & D. RiEsmAN, THE AcA-
DEMIc REVOLUTION 292-98 (1968); A. MONTAGUE, THE NATURAL SUPERIoRa= OF WOMEN
128-29 (1967); G. MmaRAL, AN AasmEcAN DII MA 1075-77 (1962); Hacker, Women As
a Minority Group, 30 SOCIAL FORCES 60 (Sept. 1951); Harris, The Second Sex in Academe,
56 AAUP BULL. 283 (Sept. 1970); cf. K. CLARK, PREJuDICE AND YoUR CHILD 39 (2d. ed.
1963); Note, The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A
Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. REv. 427, 433 (1953).
19. S. BRUBAcHER & W. RtmY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANsrToN 66-71 (1968); C.
JENKS & D. REESMAN, supra note 18, at 292-98; M. NEwcoremt, A CENTURY OF HIGHER
EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN WOMEN ch. 2 (1959).
20. "Discrimination in education is one of the most damaging injustices women
suffer. It denies them equal education and equal employment opportunity, contributing
to a second class self image." REPORT OF THE PREsmENT's TASK FORCE, supra note 1,
at 7. See also Harris, supra note 18, at 283.
21. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 491-92 (D.D.C. 1967).
22. 347 U.S. at 494. "Like those minority groups whose self castigation outdoes
dominant group derision of them, women frequently exceed men in the violence of
their vituperations of their sex." Hacker, supra note 18, at 61.
23. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950).
24. 347 U.S. at 493, quoting from Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1949).
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of teaching, campus atmosphere, and academic reputation that can
never be equalized. While there are a few good women's colleges,
a look at any standard college guide shows that, as far as facilities,
staff, and courses are concerned, the better women's schools are
not nearly equal in quality to the better men's or coeducational
schools.2
The Gourman Institute ratings for all women's schools are at least
two hundred points (on an 800 scale, 400 being accreditation level)
below those of their supposedly equivalent men's schools.... Even
at the best-known women's schools, the smaller endowment, more
limited facilities, and smaller range of courses, especially in male-
dominated fields, affect all women students. Our society does not
yet value the education of women as highly as it values that of
men, and consequently we do not invest as much in female as we
do in male education. As with racially segregated education, sex-
segregated education works to the disadvantage of the group which
is discriminated against.26
As a result, females are not only deprived of the personal advan-
tages of being well-educated, but also they are handicapped in
securing employment dependent upon educational background.
The separate but equal doctrine has superficial appeal, but, be-
cause it seriously misconstrues the realities of education, it can-
not withstand even slight scrutiny.
Even if separate educational facilities were not inherently un-
equal, they would still be unconstitutional unless they were equal
in fact. This was the approach taken in the Kirstein case, wherein
the court found that the prestige of the main campus of the Uni-
versity and some of the courses of instruction offered there were
not available at other state schools.21 Even Williams rests on the
proposition that state institutions limited to one sex are permissi-
ble only if the state educational system taken as a whole does in
fact provide equal educational opportunity for both sexes.28 The
25. See, e.g., AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES AND COL-
LEGES (9th ed., A. Cartter ed. 1964); J. CASS & M. BIRNBAUM, COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO
AMERICAN COLLEGES (1965); LOVEjOY'S COLLEGE GUIDE (llth ed. 1970).
26. Harris, supra note 18, at 293.
27. 309 F. Supp. at 187.
28. That is quite clear from the court's statement that if the state operated only
one college, "there can be no question that to deny males admission thereto would be
impermissible," and that the plaintiffs were not denied equality of opportunity because
there was "a complete range of state institutions they [could] attend." 316 F. Supp. at 137.
614
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separate but equal rationale could not save sexual admission poli-
cies in state educational systems that do not possess at least some
semblance of sexual equality. For example, the state system as 'a
whole must be able to accommodate as many female as male appli-
cants and must make its course selections equally available for all.
As far as private institutions are concerned, it is at least arguable
that since they are not part of a system like state schools, they have
no counterparts with which to be equal 9 and therefore they can-
not be protected by the separate but equal doctrine. At any rate,
sexual separatism at private or public schools, if not inherently
discriminatory, still violates the fourteenth amendment if it does
not provide equality in fact for men and women.
The assertion in Williams that the state system of higher edu-
cation in South Carolina, or for that matter any other state, does
in fact provide equal, though separate, educational opportunity
for both sexes at best is valid only in the abstract. Even though
there might be a theoretical place for a student somewhere in a
state school system, sexual admission policies operate in conjunc-
tion with other factors to make it impossible or extremely difficult
for many students to secure the theoretical place to which they
should be entitled. In the first place, many students, even if they
wanted to, cannot afford the expenses of leaving their home town
and traveling across the state to attend college.30 Married stu-
dents, particularly, are not in the position to disrupt their family
lives by leaving home to obtain an education.3 ' In Williams, the
29. For those men's colleges that have coordinate or "sister" schools for women,
it could be argued that they should be treated as a system of schools like the state
colleges.
30. "There appear to be two basic reasons for the shift to coeducational institu-
tions. The first is the increasing insistence of students on attending the institution
within reach of home. This is primarily a financial matter, and its growing importance
seems to result from the fact that with the increasing numbers of young people who go
to college, a larger proportion is coming from the lower income groups." M. NEw-
coMER, supra note 19, at 39.
31. "Another factor limiting students to institutions in a particular area is the
growing tendency to marry before graduation from college. This, particularly for
women, but also to some extent for men, limits the range of choice. The woman can
complete her education only if she can attend her husband's college, or the only
institution within reach of his job. And sometimes the husband is similarly restricted
to the place where his wife can find employment." Id. at 39-40.
"[E]ducation must be geographically available where the woman is. If she breaks
away from school or college to marry, she is less likely to return after a gap than if
practicable means of continued study are immediately at hand. Many current rigidities in
regard to admission ... will have to yield to greater flexibility." REPORT Or T PPmSr-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 13 (1962).
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plaintiffs pointed out that they were being deprived of equal op-
portunity to obtain an education because the school that denied
them admission due to their sex was "more convenient geographi-
cally for them than the other State institutions. '3 2 The court,
quoting Heaton v. Bristol, answered that the plaintiffs, in "'being
denied the right to attend the State college in their home town,
are treated no differently than are other students who reside in
communities many miles distant from any State supported college
or university.' "3 That answer entirely misses the point-sexual
admission policies do make access to schools less available for some
persons than for others. The point is not that individuals have
the right to a geographically convenient education (although that
isn't a bad idea), but rather that they should not be deprived of
the opportunity to attend a conveniently located school because
of their sex. There is no doubt that sexual admission policies do
deprive persons of access to geographically convenient schools
that would otherwise be available, and in some situations, such
as occurred in the Kirstein case, those policies make it impossible
for persons to go to any school whatsoever. 4
When the choice is to be made as to which college or univer-
sity a student will attend, many factors in addition to each schools
location enter into consideration. Not only will the prospective
undergraduate look to the course offerings and facilities of any
particular institution, but will also consider other tangible and
intangible qualities of each university, such as its academic repu-
tation and the nature of its campus life.35 Ideally, the student will
be presented with a wide range of alternatives, each with positive
and negative factors. The more specialized the area in which the
student wishes to concentrate, the narrower his choice between al-
ternatives. However, to further limit the choice by a factor totally
divorced from abilities or goals, namely sex, is unconscionable.
32. 316 F. Supp. at 138.
33. Id.
34. "[Some individuals] are not in a position . . . to go elsewhere without harm
to themselves and disruption of their lives. A pattern of continued sex restriction would
present these plaintiffs with the dilemma of choosing between the marriage relation-
ship and further education. We think the state may not constitutionally impose upon a
qualified young woman applicant the necessity of making such a choice." 309 F. Supp.
at 187.
35. Many students, both male and female, also strongly prefer to attend schools that
have coeducational student bodies. M. Newcomer, supra note 19, at 40.
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Thus, a woman who wishes to be an engineer but is denied ad-
mission to any university that would satisfy her goal will find little
consolation in the fact that she can receive an education elsewhere,
if she will but choose another profession3 6 Furthermore, her
choice as to the highest quality school in any given field is unjusti-
fiably limited if she must pursue an inferior education because
she is barred from the better schools because of sex. To allow her
to become an engineer, but one with inferior training, will be a
frustrating experience. By further decreasing educational oppor-
tunity, sexual admission policies merely compound the many real
limitations upon the choices that students have in selecting a col-
lege or university that can meet their needs.
Admission policies based on sex cause harmful discrimination
by implying that women are inferior and by denying students
equality of educational opportunity. For all oppressed groups edu-
cation has become the first and perhaps the most important step
in breaking the barriers of second-class status. A baccalaureate
has replaced the high school diploma as the sine qua non for em-
ployment; and entrance into the professions is even more hopeless
without a graduate degree. 7 Statistics amply demonstrate that the
life-long earnings of individuals bear a direct relationship to the
amount of schooling they have had,38 and studies indicate that
higher earnings depend more upon a college education than upon
ability and background. 9 Jacques Barzun has succinctly described
the importance a college education has for subjugated persons:
36. In Williams, while the plaintiffs did point to the discrimination of being denied
admission to a conveniently located school, they "point[ed] to no courses peculiar to Win-
throp in which they wish[ed] to enroll." a16 F. Supp. at 138. Whether or not such
courses existed cannot be ascertained from the opinion; however, the curricula offered by
men's women's and coeducational schools usually do differ.
37. "College attendance and a college degree are as necessary today as high school
attendance and a high school diploma were in the past. The economic, social, and
cultural forces in our society are all pushing in that direction." EEeNTS OF THE UNI-
VERsrTY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, THE REGENTS STATEWIDE PLAN FOR THE EXPANSION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION 9 (1964). See also Jencks & Riesman, Where
Graduate Schools Fail, THE ATLANnC, Feb. 1968, at 49.
38. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMNEN
OTHER PuBLCATIONS OF THE COMMISSION, AMERICAN WOMEN 92-94 (M. Mead & F. Kaplan
ed. 1965); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABsrAcr OF THE U.S. 1970 at 111,
325; U.S. DEPT oF rHEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 1969 DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL
STATISTICS 14.
39. G. BEcKm, HUMAN CAPITAL Ch. 4 (1964); B. WEISBROD & P. KARPoFF, MONETARY
RETURNS TO COLLEGE EDUCATION, STUDENT ABILITY, AND COLLEGE QUALITY, REvIEW OF
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 491-97 (1968).
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In American society the college is the gateway to good employ-
ment. Every year the figure goes up that expresses the value of a
college education in future earnings. Banks publish it, parents day-
dream about it. Depressed minorities view the college as the tun-
nel out of prison into economic freedom-it is the great equalizer,
as Horace Mann once said of all education. But now nothing short
of college is education.40
Furthermore, sexual admission policies harm the nation as a whole
by depriving it of a source of educated workers who are needed to
meet the country's economic, technological, and social demands. 41
From the nation's standpoint, "the security and welfare of the
United States require that this and future generations of Ameri-
can youth be assured ample opportunity for the fullest develop-
ment of their intellectual capacities." Thus, there can be little
doubt that the discrimination caused by sexual admission policies
is of serious consequence to the nation itself and to the individ-
uals who comprise it, both of which depend greatly upon higher
education.
Equality of educational opportunity is also important be-
cause it is closely related to freedom of speech and association.
What could be more meaningful than the opportunity to learn
and to exchange ideas with individuals of all kinds? "The Amer-
ican people have always regarded education and acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance, which should be
diligently promoted."4 3 American higher education is supposedly
dedicated to freedom of expression; yet, we live in a land where
a qualified student may be turned away from a school for no
other reason than her sex. The possibility of an infringement of
first amendment rights further aggravates the serious harm caused
by sexual admissions policies.
40. J. BARZUN, TiE AMERICAN UNrVERSITY 212 (1968).
41. "Institutions of higher education play a vital role in the United States economy.
As firms in an industry, these institutions absorb inputs and produce an output, both
of which are of value to the society .... The outputs of these institutions consist of a
more highly educated and productive citizenry, the results of research and the discovery
of new knowledge, and, indirectly, a more rapid rate of economic growth. A strong
system of higher education is essential in furthering individual aspirations, in develop.
ing a progressive economy, and in insuring a humane and sensitive society." JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Tim ECONOMICS AND FINANCING OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STXTES, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Comm. Print 1969).
42. Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. § 701 (1964).
43. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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III. THE LACK OF JUSTIFICATION FOR SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
IN COLLEGE ADMISSION POLICIES
The defenders of sexual segregation in higher education offer
questionable explanations to justify the discriminatory harm
which it causes. For example, in Williams the court stated that
it is conceded that recognized pedagogical opinion is divided on
the wisdom of maintaining 'single-sex' institutions of higher edu-
cation but it is stipulated that there is a respectable body of edu-
cators who believe that 'a single-sex institution can advance the
quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating upon
areas of primary interest to only one sex.'"4
It is not clear from this statement whether the court means that
there is some expert opinion that the quality of education may be
better when men and women are separated, or that the quality of
education may be better when schools, instead of spreading them-
selves thin over a complete range of studies, can select certain
fields, which happen to be of primary interest to one sex, to con-
centrate their efforts upon. If the court means the latter there is
no need or justification for a school to have sexual admission poli-
cies. Expert authority may support the theory that a liberal arts
education, for instance, is better when a school can devote all of
its resources to liberal arts courses, but that hardly means that
only men or women can or should be in the liberal arts. It is one
thing for a school to offer only certain fields of study that may
happen to be of primary interest to members of one sex, and quite
another thing for a school to automatically exclude members of
the other sex who are also interested in that field of study. While
educators and the state governments may decide that home eco-
nomics students should be separated from engineering students
so that they may better pursue their studies, 45 it is not for them to
decide that all the "fine young women" should be home econo-
mists and all the "fine young men" should be engineers.46 Even if
44. 316 F. Supp. at 137.
45. This might raise the problem of de facto segregation, but that is a problem for
the future.
46. "What is needed to remove the present ambiguity of women's legal status is
a shift of emphasis from women's class attributes (sex per se) to their functional attri-
butes. . . . If laws classifying persons by sex were prohibited by the Constitution, and
if it were made clear that laws recognizing functions, if performed, are not based on
sex per se, much of the confusion as to the legal status of women would be eliminated."
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educational policy could justify the separation of fields of study,
it would not justify restricting any of those fields to members of
one sex only.
If, however, the above mentioned statement in Williams was
meant to assert that there is some expert opinion to the effect that
separation of the sexes in itself improves the quality of education,
the court's position is even more suspect. In what way does sexual
segregation per se improve the quality of education? Certainly
sexual discrimination in higher education, with all its harsh effects,
cannot be deemed justified by an unsupported and vague gener-
ality that some authorities think that a segregated education is
somehow "better" than an integrated one. Depending on the kind
of rights involved, inequality of treatment may be justified in
some cases by a reasonable state interest, while in other cases it
can only be justified by a compelling state interest. Although the
courts have not yet considered the issue, it is probable that, be-
cause education is so important and intertwined with freedom of
expression, it "is a right which states may restrict only for 'com-
pelling' reasons, if at all."47 The bald assertion that a segregated
education is preferable can hardly be said to constitute such a
''compelling state interest" or even a reasonable one as to justify
the discrimination.
I At a time when the knowledge and accepted beliefs about
men and women were quite different than they are today, sexual
discrimination was justified on the theory that women were in-
nately incapable of performing the same functions as men. This
theory spawned sexual separatism in higher education, 4 as well as
the legal doctrine, most often associated with the 1908 case of
Muller v. Oregon,49 that "sex is a valid basis of classification." In-
creasingly rejected by lower courts, °0 the Muller doctrine is of
dubious validity today, especially since it is founded upon a theory
Murray & Eastwood, supra note 9, at 238-41. See also, Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of
Sex.Based Discrimination in American Law, 48 NEB. L. REv. 131, 137-40 (1968).
47. - Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial
Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis. L. Ra,. 7, 18.
48. See sources cited at supra note 19.
49. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
50. See, e.g., Kirstein v. University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970);
United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); White v. Crook,
251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820
(W.D. Mich. 1966).
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that has lost most of its credence. The passage of federal and- state
laws prohibiting unequal treatment of the sexes in employment51
clearly indicates that even the country's legislatures, which are
hardly purveyors of radical social ideas, have recognized that
women can perform almost all tasks equally as well as men. Even
if it is believed that men and women are different in some respects,
few people, if any, currently would suggest that men are inher-
ently better college students than women. Indeed, today it would
be an absurdity to say that innate differences between men and
women justify sexual classifications in higher education admission
policies.
Although most, if not all, authorities no longer argue that
women are innately incapable of keeping up with men in the
classroom, certain prejudices still exist, even among some of the
more "enlightened" experts about the role that women should
play in society. The contemporary argument made in favor of
sexual segregation in higher education is that some females do not
perform well in the presence of male classmates because, as Jencks
and Riesman put it, "women worried about their femininity are
understandably fearful of seeming too bright or too competent in
direct competition with male classmates."52 That argument, while
it may accurately describe some females under current conditions,
places women in a vicious circle, because "femininity" is a cultur-
ally acquired form of behavior that has developed from a male-
oriented society of which sexual separatism is a manifestation. 3
Separation of the sexes fosters the concept of "femininity" which
in turn hampers women from being capable of breaking the
barrier of separation of the sexes. To accept "femininity" as a
reason for maintaining sexual segregation ignores that "femi-
ninity" is a cultural phenomenon that has been imposed upon
women, and that may cause more harm than good for both men
51. The federal legislation is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963. As of 1969, 31 states had equal pay acts, and 21 states plus the
District of Columbia had acts prohibiting sexual discrimination. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 267, 269-70.
52. C. JENCKS & D. RIESmAN, supra note 18, at 306. It should be noted that this
argument only goes to justifying the maintenance of women's schools, and not men's
schools.
53. See S. DE BEAUVOm, THE SECOND SEx (1953) ; B. FmR1DAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE
(1963) ; K. MmLm-r, SExuAL PoLrrcs (1970).
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and women." Like other rationalizations to support subordination
of groups, the "femininity" argument pretends to be in the best
interest of the subordinate group, when actually it operates to
further suppress the group. As Jencks and Riesman admit, even
on a more superficial level, the "femininity" argument is an un-
certain one.
[he advantages of segregation for women are equivocal. Men are
almost always vicariously present for girls, just as whites are for
American Negroes, even if they are physically missing. Girls in
women's colleges seem to worry as much about being really femi-
nine as girls in coeducational colleges, and perhaps more.6
On the other hand, in a coeducational environment, women may
be liberated by the discovery that they do not always have to relate
to their male classmates on a sexual basis.60 Most important, a
sexually segregated education does not remedy the problems that
women face concerning their "femininity"; at best, it merely post-
pones resolution of the problems.
Sexual discrimination in higher education is justified at times
by the argument that some colleges and universities are not
equipped with dormitory or other facilities to accommodate
women. The validity of this argument is doubtful, since many
schools have easily and inexpensively converted dormitories and
other facilities from use by members of one sex to use by members
of the other, and back again. More importantly, this argument is
not a justification for sexual discrimination; it is merely an ex-
cuse. In several cases, the Supreme Court has held that frugality
is no justification for discrimination, 7 and there certainly is no
merit to the assertion that a school may exclude women merely
because all the available facilities are being used by men.
54. In an essay for Time Magazine, Gloria Steinem has perceptively pointed out
many of the benefits that men would receive as a result of sexual egalitarianism. Among
those related to education equality are that men "will no longer be the only ones to
support the family [and] . . . bear the strain of power and responsibility," nor will men
be "encouraged to spend a lifetime living with inferiors; with housekeepers, or de-
pendent creatures who are still children." There will be "no more unequal partner-
ships that eventually doom love and sex." Timsz, Aug. 31, 1970, at 22-25.
55. C. JENCKS & D. RIESrAN, supra note 18, at 307.
56. Id.
57. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The implication of Brown and its progeny that education is
a fundamental right warrants the test of a compelling state in-
terest to justify any infringement of that right. There is a growing
awareness that no such compelling state interest or even a reason-
able one can be found to justify discriminatory admission policies
based on sex. An admissions policy which uses sex as a criterion
for exclusion therefore violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The value of sexual separatism in higher
education, if any, is so minimal that the resultant disadvantages
of inferior education and second-class status are so disproportion-
ate as to be totally unjustifiable.

